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A. TRANSLATING ORDINARY LANGUAGE INTO FUNCTIONAL LOGIC
Work continues on the COMIT program, which was described in Quarterly Progress
Report No. 68 (pages 174-175), for translating ordinary language into symbolic logic.
The last report described a program for translating sentences and arguments formu-
lated in ordinary English into the notation of propositional logic. Since that time, the
author has been working on the extension of that program to perform translations into
a "higher" type of logic, i.e., first-order functional calculus. The work that he has
done thus far on this subject may be described under three headings: (I) the formula-
tion of a logical grammar, which states the essential logical characteristics of some
types of statements in ordinary language which are most readily analyzable into for-
mulae in functional calculus; (II) the writing of a COMIT program that employs this
grammar for random generation of sentences; and (III) the writing of a COMIT pro-
gram for recognition of the grammatical structures of the sentences of the relevant
type.
As for (I), the sentences that lie within the scope of our grammar are of two types.
In the first type of sentence, an 'NP' (the commonly accepted abbreviation of 'noun
phrase') is connected to another NP by a form of the verb 'to be'. In the second type,
an NP is linked to another NP by what we may rather sententiously call a "binary rela-
tional construction," by which we mean a word or a phrase such as 'helps', 'belongs to',
or 'is greater than'. These words and phrases do not fit snugly into any one grammat-
ical category (for instance, they cannot all be described as transitive verbs), but all
do the job of stating a comparison or relation between two essentially different NPs.
These two sentential types are succinctly stated in two COMIT rules:
(1) S = NP + BE + NP; (2) S = NP + P/.2 + NP
in which 'S' stands for 'sentence', 'BE' for the verb 'to be', 'P/.2' for any binary rela-
tional construction, and 'NP', as stated above, for 'noun phrase'. Moreover, 'NP' may
be expanded in either of two ways, formulable in the COMIT rules:
(3) NP = CONST; (4) NP = Q/X + PHI/X.
According to (3), 'NP' may be replaced by a proper name, such as 'George Washington'
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or 'Chicago'. According to (4), 'NP' may be replaced by a function 'PHI' of X preceded
by a determiner or quantifier 'Q' for X. The 'Qs' of X are phrases like 'the X', 'some
X', 'exactly five X', and 'at least two X'. The 'PHIs' of X are expressible in the fol-
lowing COMIT rules (a)-(g), in which the only symbol not previously explained is 'P/. 1',
which stands for nontransitive (or "unary") predicate constructions such as 'is a horse',
'is a Professor of Greek', 'lives', or almost any verb or verbal construction that is not
followed by a direct object. (Many verbs, of course, are not definitely classifiable
either as transitive or intransitive, e.g., 'believes' and 'sees'. In such cases the rec-
ognition program has to look at what immediately follows the verb before opting defi-
nitely either for P/.1 or P/.2).
(a) PHI/X = X + P/.1 (e) PHI/X = Y + P/.2 + X
(b) PHI/X = X + P/.2 + NP (f) PHI/X = PHI/X + AND + PHI/X
(c) PHI/X = NP + P/.2 + X (g) PHI/X = PHI/X + OR + PHI/X
(d) PHI/X = X + P/.2 + Y
In the formulae above, X and Y may be replaced by any letters from A to Z, subject
to certain conditions. Whenever 'NP' is expanded into 'Q/X + PHI/X', in accordance
with formula (4), the 'X' chosen is the next letter in alphabetical order; i.e., the first
substitution for 'X' is 'A'; the second, 'B'; and so on. (An exception to this rule is
made in sentences of type I, in which one may begin expanding both 'NPs' with the same
letter 'A'.) The 'Y', in (d) and (e) above, is any letter that has been previously used.
The following examples (i)-(vii) are all examples of 'NPs', according to our grammar.
They illustrate, respectively, rules (a)-(g) above for the expansion of 'PHI/X'. In each
case, the phrase 'such that', although logically redundant, is inserted between 'Q/X'
and 'PHI/X' to improve legibility. The generation program, also, employs this device.
(i) The A such that A is a horse.
(ii) At least one D such that D admires George Washington.
(iii) Some B such that Chicago likes B.
(iv) Exactly three C such that C notices A.
(v) All B such that A is greater than B.
(vi) No A such that A is a horse and A is Chicago.
(vii) At most five C such that C is a Professor of Greek or C is a
Professor of Latin.
An example of a complete sentence which may be translated into the terminology above
is the following, taken from I. M. Copi's Symbolic Logic.'
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(viii) The architect who designed Tappan Hall designs only
office buildings.
Stated in our terminology, it becomes
(ix) The A such that A is an architect and A designs Tappan
Hall designs only B such that B is an office building.
It may be noted that two different variables, 'A' and 'B', are employed, and that the
imperfect 'designed' is replaced by the present 'designs'. This replacement simpli-
fies the sentence by reducing what are, on the face of it, two transitive verbs to one;
and it does not affect the logic of the sentence. An example of a sentence that the
machine randomly generated using our grammar is
(x) SIWASH + LIKES + EXACTLY + ONE + X/A + SUCH + THAT + X/A + IS + A +
WOMAN + AND + SOME + X/B + SUCH + THAT + X/B + CAN + SWIM + FASTER +
THAN + ANY + X/C + SUCH + THAT + X/C + IS + JACK + OF + X/A + CAN +
COMMAND + X/A + AND + X/A + GETS + RUSSIA +.
The last example, as opposed to the immediately preceding one, is stated in COMIT
notation. We have found it expedient to use as variables 'X/A', 'X/B', 'X/C', etc.,
rather than 'A', 'B', 'C', etc. In addition to strictly programmatic advantages, this
device avoids any confusion between the article 'A' and the letter 'A'.
Next, the recognition program takes sentences such as (ix) and (x) and "parses"
them, i.e., it tags each grammatical construction with its appropriate label. It thereby
reveals how the sentences must have been, or could have been, generated. Using the
recognition program, the computer correctly printed out the analyses of (ix) and (x);
these are included below as (xi) and (xii), respectively.
(xi) S + NP + Q/A + THE + X/A + PHI/A + PHI/A + X/A + P/.1 +
IS + AN + ARCHITECT + AND/A + PHI/A + X/A + P/.2 +
DESIGNS + NP + TAPPAN/CONST + HALL/CONST + P/.2 +
DESIGNS + NP + Q/B + ONLY + X/B + PHI/B + X/B + P/.1 +
IS + AN + OFFICE + BUILDING + .
(xii) S + NP + SIWASH/CONST + P/.2 + LIKES + NP + Q/A + EXACTLY +
ONE + X/A + PHI/A + PHI/A + PHI/A + X/A + P/.1 + IS + A +
WOMAN + AND/A + PHI/A + NP + Q/B + SOME + X/B + PHI/B + X/B +
P/.2 + CAN + SWIM + FASTER + THAN + NP + Q/C + ANY + X/C +
PHI/C + X/C + P/.2 + IS + JACK + OF + X/A + P/.2 + CAN +
COMMAND + X/A + AND/A + PHI/A + X/A + P/.2 + GETS + NP +
RUSSIA/CONST +.
It may be noted that the recognition program erases the redundant phrase 'such that'
whenever it encounters it in the input sentences. Also, it adds some additional sub-
scripts. Proper names are subscripted with 'CONST' (for 'constant'), and conjunctions
('AND' and 'OR') are subscripted with the letter possessed by the two 'PHIs' which they
connect. To discover the scope of any 'S', 'NP', or 'PHI', one may employ the following
counting method: Starting immediately to the left of the symbol whose scope is to be
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discovered, initialize the count at 1 (in COMIT, one would use a marker with the numer-
ical subscript of 1, e.g., 'M/.1'), and proceeding from left to right raise or lower the
count in accordance with the rules:
PHI, S = +2; NP = +1; P/.2 , X, AND, OR , BE =-1;
P/.l , any consecutive string of items labelled 'CONST' = -2;
all other items = 0.
The scope of the term in question is determined as soon as the count 0 is reached.
More precisely, when the count 0 is reached, one continues counting items as long as
the count remains 0. When an item is encountered which causes the count to deviate
from 0, the counting stops, and the scope is taken to be everything except the last item.
In other words, if 'P/.1' causes the count to go to 0, the counting continues until it
includes everything labelled 'P/. l', such as 'IS + A + HORSE'.
The counting method just described for determining the scope of a term has not yet
been programmed, but it will be an essential part of the next program that we intend to
write, which will translate the parsed sentences, such as (xi) and (xii), into purely
logical notation. The next task following the completion of this will be to write a pro-
gram that will translate sentences stated in the ordinary English of (viii) into the quasi-
logical language of (ix) and (x). These two uncompleted programs, in conjunction with
those already written, will constitute a complete program for translating our particular
types of sentences from ordinary English into first-order functional calculus.
J. L. Darlington
References
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B. FUNDAMENTAL SENTENCE-MEANING
1-3
In previous Quarterly Progress Reports I have pointed out that a general explana-
tion of the phenomenon of linguistic paraphrase cannot be achieved within the framework
of a theory of semantics that makes the tacit assumption that word-synonymy (or
morpheme-synonymy) alone can account for it. Such a view not only leads inexorably
to the absurd conclusion that a structural-constant, such as 'all', 'only', 'any', 'some',
'not', 'ever', must at times be considered as synonymous with one structural-constant
and at other times synonymous with a different structural-constant, but fails to pro-
vide the technical means powerful enough to discover fundamental semantical relations
that exist among these structural morphemes, relations that can be formulated into lin-
guistic laws that are general in that they encompass vast areas of linguistic phenomena,
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and are explanatory in that they provide reasons why one cannot always substitute the
same structural-constant for another in all sentences containing an occurrence of that
morpheme and obtain sentences that are synonymous, why and when there occurs a
change of meaning if one makes morpheme substitution of this kind, and so on. The
reason why a method of discovery based upon such a view of semantics cannot be pow-
erful enough to discover more fundamental laws is that it has been, by definition,
restricted to the use of only substitution rules for the greater part. That is to say, on
the basis of this assumption concerning semantics, the structure of the grammatical
strings - the very structure that is to be investigated - has been predetermined to be
essentially of the phrase-structure type, wholly accessible to constituent analysis, with
some rules of ordering of constituents thrown in when necessary. The type of grammar
has already been assumed to be a context-free grammar.
In the theory of semantics proposed by the author, it is held that the word-meaning
of these critical structural morphemes always remains constant - hence the name
structural-constant - and that the sentence -meaning can vary according to the partic -
ular configuration of structural-constants which occurs in the sentence. Some config-
urations give rise to sentences whose sentence -meanings are synonymous although there
is no one-to-one morpheme correspondence, and others give rise to sentences whose
sentence -meanings are different. In order to illuminate how the meaning of a seman-
tical structural-constant can remain constant and at the same time the sentence -meaning
can vary depending upon the structural context, let us construct the following analogy.
Let us liken the structural configuration of a sentence -type to a machine constructed
out of cogwheels, levers, rods, bolts, screws, and other such parts. The particular
set of parts and the manner in which they are connected to one another give rise to a
machine that has a certain output. The same parts, when combined in a different way,
give rise to a different machine. It may happen that particular choices of parts and
different combinations of them give rise to several machines that operate to produce
the same output, although they are not structurally isomorphic; these could be called
synonymous machines. In this case it could be said that the machines have the same
fundamental construction. In the case in which several machines are not structurally
isomorphic and do not operate to produce the same output, the machines are said to
have different fundamental constructions. A construction engineer knows which choice
of parts and which combinations of them give rise to the various kinds of machines. In
the case in which the engineer has built two or more machines that appear to be struc-
turally isomorphic but operate to produce different output, some of the machine parts
have become built-in units; the structures that differ are hidden under the cover of a
closed unit. Such machines could be said to be ambiguous.
It is obvious from the analogy that the author believes that only a context-sensitive
grammar is adequate to handle the structure of language. The analogy is so obvious
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that one need not dwell on it. But I would like to discuss briefly the semantical
structural-constants, 'all' and 'only'. It is only when one regards 'all' as a constant,
analogous to a functioning meaningful machinery part, that one can explain why 'all' can
range in meaning over 'everything', 'the totality', 'the whole', 'the end', etc. As an
operator whose function is to determine the extent of the upper boundaries enclosing
all members from the inside to the outer limits, it can range over many different types
of things; sometimes it operates on countable argument individuals, sometimes on
predicate functions such as verbs, adjectives, and nouns, sometimes on functions of
functions such as adverbs. Sometimes it operates upon the infinitely divisible parts
belonging to a whole or single individual. But it always has one job to do, a job that
never varies. The morpheme 'only' also functions to determine a boundary, but, unlike
'all', it does not specify that the total membership is involved; rather it restricts, or
clamps the lid down on the upper boundary from outside the set. 'All' and 'only' are
closely related operators in that they operate in the reverse of each other. Examples (1)
and (3) have been selected to illustrate the comparison. Since, however, there does
not exist a logical operator corresponding notationally to the grammatical form of 'only',
'only' is expressed symbolically in the predicate calculus through a paraphrase of the
sentence containing an occurrence of 'only', a paraphrase in which 'all' appears. The
English language often makes use of this paraphrase to express 'only'. Illustrations of
this usage are given in examples (7) and (9) and again in examples (20a) and (20b). In
order that people untrained in the logical symbolism of the predicate calculus can follow
the text more easily, I shall not use symbolic notation in this report. However, it must
be kept in mind that for each sentence in the examples there is a general schematization,
a symbolic formula in which the denotative terms of the sentence are expressed as vari-
ables, only the range of the variable having structural significance; this formula repre-
sents the sentence-type of the sentence in question.
In order to see the effect that 'only' can make on the fundamental sentence-meaning,
let us first examine an example of a rather simple sentence-type whose subject noun
phrase contains a universal quantifier,
(1) All women are frail
whose fundamental sentence -meaning is
(2) To be a woman is a sufficient condition of being frail.
If we replace 'all' by 'only' in sentence (1), we obtain
(3) Only women are frail
whose fundamental sentence-meaning is the reverse of sentence (2), namely,
(4) To be a woman is a necessary condition of being frail.
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The morpheme 'only' functions here to reverse the order of the asymmetrical operation
of implication. In other words, if 'all' is the major quantifier of a sentence S that can
be represented by the general formula in the predicate calculus '(x)[f(x)Dg(x)]' (read: for
every x, if x is f then x is g), then if 'only' is the major quantifier of a sentence S'
containing all the same morphemes as S with the exception of 'all', then the general
formula is written '(x)[g(x)zf(x)]' (read: for every x, if x is g then x is f). Inspection
of the symbolic forms of these two formulas reveals the reversal in the order of the
left-hand term before the symbol for implication and the right-hand term after the sym-
bol.
Given an example of a sentence-type like
(5) John needs to move to feel pain
which already expresses necessary condition, since its fundamental sentence-meaning
is
(6) Moving is a necessary condition that John must satisfy in
order to feel pain
we see that the addition of 'only' after 'needs' in sentence (5) serves again to reverse
the fundamental sentence-meaning. The resulting sentence
(7) John needs only to move to feel pain
expresses the fundamental sentence-meaning
(8) Moving is the only condition that John must satisfy in order to have pain.
The reversal that the addition of 'only' accomplishes is seen in the fact that sentence (8)
implies that not only is moving a necessary condition of feeling pain but a sufficient
condition; that is, since moving is the only condition needed, it is the necessary and
sufficient condition of producing pain. Sentence (7) is synonymous with
(9) All John needs to do is to move to feel pain
since both express the same fundamental sentence-meaning. The fundamental sentence-
meaning could be expressed in a grammatical form notationally closer to sentence (9) by
(10) All conditions that John must satisfy in order to feel pain
are the same as to move.
Incidentally, note that both sentence (7) and sentence (9) are synonymous with
(11) John need only move to feel pain
and
(12) All John need do to feel pain is to move
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in both of which 'need' is clearly a modal. Compare sentences (11) and (12) with the
sentence -type of sentence (5) in which there is not the option of using the modal form
or the verbal form of 'need'; the verbal form is obligatory.
By understanding the role that the semantic and purely syntactic structural-constants
play in giving rise to sentence-meaning, there does not seem to be anything more myste-
rious in the concept of sentence-synonymy than there is in two maps, very different in
outward shape, representing the same country through different projections. As long
as there exists a one-to-one mapping between the projections, the two maps are regarded
as fundamentally isomorphic. In the investigation of fundamental semantical relations of
a natural language system, we search for translation rules that transform one sentence
into another sentence that is synonymous with it. These translation rules are the mapping
rules of the linguist interested in a semantically grounded grammar.
Every translation rule is justified as a correct rule if and only if there corresponds
to it a metalanguage statement, empirically established as true, which states the funda-
mental sentence-meaning that the synonymous sentences have in common. Basic trans-
lation rules are, of course, not easy to discover, particularly if the problem is attacked
by a hit-or-miss, trial-and-error method. Since the domain of linguistic data is so
immense, a procedure without a logically directed program of attack can be quite fruit-
less. Fortunately, one can utilize the knowledge gained from the advances made in the
understanding of the logical structure of artificial language systems such as the
predicate-calculus to construct such a program, even though one knows from experience
that a natural language system is not as limited in scope or purpose as an artificial one.
If we regard the artificial logical calculi as analogs of natural language systems, we are
justified in assuming that there must exist a metalogic for any language system, that is,
a body of implicit basic rules governing the use of the conventional symbols in the lan-
guage: implicit derivation rules, formation rules, and axioms. If there did not exist such
a logical set of rules governing the grammatical forms of sentences, it would be difficult
to understand how a language could be mastered, since it would then not be a system but
a very large set of unconnected strings. When one masters a language one has learned
how to use these rules; but there is a differeice between being able to use a rule and
being able to state the rule explicitly. Observation and intuitive knowledge of the lan-
guage in question can lead to the establishing of a set of explicit translation rules,
accepted as correct because many sentences have been tested empirically to confirm the
fact that the structural-constants do, in fact, behave in the way stipulated. Thus when
one has stated some of the metalogical rules, one can use them to demonstrate, according
to the metalogic of that language, that certain sentences are synonymous. That is, one
can validate the intuitive recognition of synonymy of several sentences by logical proof,
a logical proof that utilizes only a partial knowledge of the meanings of some important
structural-constants in that language, the meanings of the denotative constants, and the
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fundamental meanings of a few well-chosen sets of synonymous sentences regarded as
axioms, and the logical rules of deductive inference. If the synonymy of sentences can
be validated, one is confirmed in believing that the rules already formulated are actually
basic to that language system. Furthermore, new structural-constants and new rules
can be discovered in terms of the old. The following examples have been selected to
illustrate how English sentences, found intuitively to be synonymous, can be proved to
be synonymous by a tentatively accepted metalogic of English.
The concepts of upper and lower bounds play an important role in the English lan-
guage. Since the quantifier 'all' is essential in symbolic formulas expressing ideas
concerning limits, let us compare some sentences containing different grammatical
occurrences of 'all' with their respective intuitively synonymous sentences.
(13a) I helped him all I could
(13b) I helped him as much as I could
(14a) St. Paul is the farthest I will go
(14b) I will go only as far as St. Paul
(14c) St. Paul is all the farther I will go
(15a) What big eyes you have! All the better to see you, my dear
(15b) What big eyes you have! So much the better to see you, my dear
(16a) He was all but smiling
(16b) He was almost (nearly) smiling
(17a) He was anything but smiling
(17b) He was far from smiling
(18a) All I could do was to smile
(18b) I could only smile
(19a) It was all I could do to smile
(19b) I could hardly smile
(20a) I was all afire
(20b) I was completely afire
(21a) All of the class was excited
(21b) The whole class was excited
According to grammarians such as Poutsma, 'all' in sentence (13a) is to be equated
with 'as much as' in sentence (13b), since these words can be interchanged with the
meaning of the original sentence preserved. According to the principle of sentence-
synonymy, the two sentences as wholes have the same fundamental sentence -meaning
but no synonymy holds between 'all' and 'as much as'. In sentence (13a), the universal
quantifier ranges over the set of possible degrees of help that xl was able to give; thus
x1 helped x2 with every degree of help that it was possible for xl to give x2 . If xl helped
with all possible degrees, xl helped with the highest degree as well. That is to say, x l
helped up to the limit of his ability. Another sentence that is synonymous with
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sentences (13a) and (13b), which corresponds to this last statement that was derived by
logical inference, is 'I helped him the most I could'. Sentence (13b), on the other hand,
states that the amount of help given to x 2 was 'equal to' or 'as much as' the amount xl
was able to give. Since the amount that it was possible for xl to give is, in fact, the
greatest amount, more being impossible, the amount of help given equals the largest
or the upper limit. Ergo, the fundamental sentence-meaning for all three statements
has been proved to be identical. Their sentence-types, however, are different. It is
to be noted that the verb 'help', conceived as having different intensities ordered as to
degree, is a necessary assumption to the explanation of the sentence -synonymy. The
English language makes much use of the notion of ordering, as we shall see in
examples (14)-(19).
The sentence-meaning of sentence (14a) is a very direct expression of the funda-
mental sentence-meaning of all three examples in set (14), which is
(22) St. Paul is the upper limit of the distance from an initial point
that xl is willing to go
because the sentence itself identifies by means of the word 'is' the place, St. Paul, with
'the point that is farthest', the use of the superlative guaranteeing the uniqueness of the
point that is farther than all other points xl is willing to go to from a given starting
point. The sentence-meaning of (14b) states that xl is willing to go (from some given
point) as far as St. Paul but no farther; thus sentence (14b) states that xl is willing to
go from an initial point to a point that is 'equal to' or 'as far as' the upper bound,
St. Paul, and does not exceed that point. Whether St. Paul is said to be the limit itself,
or the distance that xl is willing to go is declared to be as far as but not farther than
the limit, the distance in both cases is the same; hence the two sentences are synony-
mous. The grammatical differences and similarities between the two sentences are
easily seen when both are put into their schematic formulations.
The proof of the synonymy of sentence (14c) to (14a) and (14b) is more complicated.
The phrase 'all the farther' refers to the total increase in distance. The complete
meaning of 'x is farther than y' has to be expressed 'x is farther from an initial point
y than y is by a specific but unknown amount a', i.e., x increases in distance away
from yo more than y increases in distance by a definite increase. It should be noted
that in any ordering relation applied to things, whether the ordering be in terms of
intensity, degree, or size, there is always an amount involved. Sentence (14c) identi-
fies two classes by means of the word 'is', which stands between the left-hand phrase
that defines the set of points, '(from yo to) St. Paul', and the right-hand phrase that
defines the well-ordered set of points, 'all the increases in distance xl is willing to
go'. The right-hand phrase can be represented as the union of the collection of sets
containing as members all of the a's, which are obtained by taking in their ordered
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turn all those points that are distant from yo to which x 1 is willing to go. Thus each
new point that x 1 is willing to go to starting from yo farther than the previous point
becomes an upper bound in its turn so that the smallest that each increase can be is
simply from one point to the next farther point. The sum of all of these increases (or
all farther points) is, of course, equal to the distance from yo to St. Paul because the
sentence has equated these two sets. The sets are identical because each set has
exactly the same members. The sentence-type of (14c) is quite different from those
of (14a) and (14b). Both (14a) and (14b) correspond notationally to the standard sym-
bolic definition of an upper bound; sentence (14c), by declaring the two sets to be iden-
tical, lays down a condition under which there must exist an upper bound to the set of
points to which x1 is willing to go.
In (15a) we have the familiar lines in the nursery tale of Red Riding Hood and the
wolf. There is again ordering according to size; but in this example two properties
are being ordered and the ordering is correlated, since the value of the increase or
decrease in one variable depends upon the determination of the increase or decrease
in the other. The wolf's assumption is
(23) The bigger the eye, the better the sight of the eye.
The fundamental sentence-meaning of (23) is that the goodness of the sight of the
eye increases as a function of the greatness of size of the eye. In sentence (23), the
independent variable is given in the first phrase, the dependent in the second, so that
the ordering of the two phrases is an indispensable feature of the sentence-meaning.
If the order is reversed, grammatical changes occur; the synonymous sentence would
then be
(24) The sight of the eye is better, the bigger the eye.
When Red Riding Hood asserts that Grandma's eyes are large, she means that as
eyes they have the property of largeness, since size is never an absolute property but
is relative to the kind of object talked about. Hence the word 'large' must be defined
'large with respect to some standard'. Grandma's eyes being a specific amount,
although an unknown amount, larger than average, the ability of her sight is directly
correlated to that amount and can, in theory, be calculated. The phrase 'all the better
to see you' in sentence (15a) is similar to the phrase 'all the farther' in the previous
example, since it too denotes the set of 'all the increases in goodness of seeing'. The
sum of all these increases equals the amount that her eyes are larger than average.
Hence sentence (15b) that asserts 'that much (or so much) better to see you' is synon-
ymous with sentence (15a) because the union of the set of all the increases equals that
definite amount, the difference in size of eye; hence 'so much the better' can replace
'all the better'.
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Examples (16)-(19) illustrate that the English language possesses techniques for
handling the concept of proximity to total absence or total presence of a property. Does
a person either smile or not smile? Our language is able to construct statements
expressing how close to the boundary of yes or no a fact may be. In sentence (16a) xl
is not smiling but very near to the upper bound of the separation between not smiling
and smiling. The definition of the complex quantifier 'almost' involves the occurrence
of the universal quantifier 'all' in combination with the structural-constant 'except' or
'but' to exclude a limited finite number or amount from the total set - an amount that
approaches but never reaches zero as the limit. Hence, the words 'all but' correspond
directly to the definition of 'almost'.
Sentence (17a) states that x 1 was not smiling but states that every property that could
be included as part of smiling was absent; hence x1 is far from the upper bound of the
separation between smiling and not smiling.
The synonymy of sentences (18a) and (18b) was treated in detail in Quarterly Progress
Report No. 66 (pages 289-293). I included them in this report to complete the list of
different grammatical occurrences of 'all' and to bring into sharp focus the critical effect
resulting from additional words such as 'It was' placed in front of sentence (18a), as in
example (19a). Sentence (19a) expresses the sentence-meaning that although x 1 smiled,
it was necessary for him to use the limit of his ability to do so. Thus x1 was close to
the lower limit of smiling, that is, close to not smiling.
The synonymy of sentences (20a) and (20b) is demonstrated by showing that the
universal-quantifier 'all' ranges over all of the parts of an individual. Since 'all' is a
unity, it includes all of its parts and is therefore complete.
The explanation of the synonymy of sentences (21a) and (21b) is similar to the expla-
nation of set (20). It should be pointed out that sentences (20a) and (20b) are synonymous
with 'I was wholly afire'. In set (21), the universal-quantifier 'all' again operates upon
the parts of an individual. In the case of sentence (21a) the use of the definite article
before 'class', a collective noun, shows that 'class' is regarded as singular. 'All of
the class' and 'the whole class' refer to the class as a complete unity, that is, the
individual composed of all of its parts.
It has perhaps been remarked that the phrase 'fundamental sentence -meaning' has
been used frequently. What is the exact meaning of this phrase and just what is the
relation between fundamental sentence-meaning and ordinary sentence-meaning? In
this report I would like to discuss and clarify this elusive concept and try to explain
its role in relating sentences as synonymous.
In Quarterly Progress Report No. 68 (pages 176-180) I stated that the fundamental
sentence -meaning was logical in form, not grammatical; it was the forms of the sen-
tences found to be synonymous by empirical observation which were grammatical. On
the basis of my present point of view, I would not now deny grammatical form to the
QPR No. 69 176
(XIII. MECHANICAL TRANSLATION)
sentence stating the fundamental sentence-meaning of a set of sentences that are alike
in expressing that sentence -meaning. Rather, I would describe the relationship of this
sentence to the others as follows. While it is true that fundamental sentence -meaning
is a concept belonging properly to the field of logic, this fact means that the sentence
stating the fundamental meaning of a set of synonymous sentences belongs properly to
the metalanguage of our language system; the synonymous sentences referred to by the
metalinguistic statement belong to the object language of English. The metalinguistic
statement states explicitly, by means of denotative terms, the specific kind of relation
that exists between the events or things designated by specific types of object-language
sentences. That is, the metalinguistic sentence, by stating which basic relation the
object-language sentences express, is using the name of this particular relation deno-
tatively; thus, for example, the phrase 'necessary condition' is itself not a structural-
constant but a denotative term, defined lexically in the same manner as other nouns,
and behaving grammatically as one. Like all other sentences, the metalanguage sen-
tence has a grammatical structure that can be described, and a sentence-meaning
of its own. In fact, it is possible for the metalanguage statement itself to be synony-
mous with other metalanguage statements if the denotative constants are the same, as
we saw in examples (8) and (10). On the other hand, the object-language sentences that
the metalanguage sentences refer to as being synonymous do not use the denotative term
to refer reflexively to themselves; they express the particular relationship that they
have in common by using the proper structural-constants in specific configurations.
They are sentences in the object language because they use structural-constants that
can be defined only in the metalanguage. Let us inspect two synonymous sentences in
the object language that are grammatically similar in that all of their denotative terms
are the same, such as
(25a) If John is to be president, he must get his organization ready now
(25b) Only if John gets his organization ready now can he be president
and compare their grammatical forms with the grammatical form of the metalanguage
sentence (26) stating their common fundamental sentence -meaning
(26) The fundamental sentence-meaning of 'If John is to be president,
he must get his organization ready now' and 'Only if John gets his
organization ready now can he be president' is that John's getting
his organization ready now is a necessary condition for John's
being president.
Sentences (25a) and (25b) do not explicitly state that one event is a necessary condition
of the other; rather each expresses this fact through its grammatical form. On the
other hand, sentence (26), although it too expresses through its grammatical form a
fundamental sentence-meaning that could be made explicit by a meta-metalanguage
statement, states explicitly which fundamental sentence -meaning examples (25a) and (25b)
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have in common, and the fundamental sentence-meaning of metalanguage sentence (26)
is not the fundamental sentence-meaning referred to by its subject noun phrase. How-
ever, if we look at only the clause 'John's getting his organization ready now is a neces-
sary condition for John to be president', we see that this part of sentence (26) has the
grammatical structure of a complete sentence and it is synonymous with sentences (25a)
and (25b) even though its denotative terms are not everywhere the same as those of
(25a) and (25b). Indeed, if this sentence were not synonymous, it could not have been
identified with the fundamental sentence-meaning of these object-language sentences. It
appears, then, that one sentence out of a set of synonymous sentences - a wider set that
includes synonymous sentences whose denotative terms are not everywhere the same -
has been selected as the sentence whose ordinary sentence-meaning is regarded as
expressing the fundamental sentence-meaning of the set. That the selection of this one
sentence is not arbitrary is seen by the fact that it alone (or synonymous sentences
whose sentence-type may differ but whose denotative terms are everywhere the same),
because of the type of grammatical structure that it has, can appear intact in a meta-
language statement of the sentence -type represented by sentence (26) in which the sub-
ject, which refers denotatively to the concept 'the fundamental sentence-meaning'
specifically identifies this sentence with it. It is obvious that neither of the object-
language sentences (25a) or (25b) could serve grammatically in this capacity. It is by
this grammatical criterion that the sentence-type of a sentence expressing the funda-
mental sentence-meaning can be objectively established as of a higher structural level
than the ordinary object-language sentences.
It should be remarked that the infinite regress that one is forced into by admission
of a hierarchy of levels of language is not so ominous as it appears, since the gram-
rratical structure of all levels has been assumed, on the basis of experience with levels
already constructed, to be similar.
The fundamental sentence-meaning, I suspect, is what has often been called the
'proposition' that sentences signify or designate. There has been much philosophical
discussion concerning the nature and ontological status of the so-called proposition. I
would not like to regard the proposition as a logical entity that is incapable of having
grammatical form. Such a view would make a mystery of what the proposition is; it
seems dubious that it could be logical in character if it cannot be expressed in language.
Once it is recognized that sentences do have a sentence -meaning that is quite distinct
from word-meaning, that there is synonymy of sentence, as well as synonymy of word,
we no longer need the 'abstract proposition' to relate sentences having the same meaning
to one another; the concept of fundamental sentence-meaning, which states what the syn-
onymous sentences express, suffices. (Incidentally, if it is possible that a sentence
expresses a sentence-meaning that is not synonymous with that of any other sentence
of the same level, its fundamental sentence -meaning must still be stated in the
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metalanguage of that language, since the metalanguage statement would utilize denotative
terms to refer explicitly to the meaning that the structural configuration of that sentence
expresses.)
The concept of 'proposition' referred not only to the entity that synonymous sentences
within the same language system designated; it stood also for the entity that related
sentences having the same meaning but belonging to different language systems because
it was felt that there must be some absolute underlying logical construction that these
sentences designated which made possible translation from one language to another.
Since the proposition could not be expressed in any of these concrete languages because
then it would be a sentence of that language, it was deemed to be not expressible in any
natural language; it stood between any two languages. It was supposed that the predicate
calculus itself was the underlying logical structure of all natural language systems, that
the predicate calculus played a role similar to the mathematical symbolism used univer-
sally by mathematicians, each of whom could use the symbolism within his own native
language. The inadequacy of the predicate calculus to fill this role has been amply
demonstrated.
According to this theory of the semantics of sentence-meaning, the concept of fun-
damental sentence-meaning is instrumental in character, not absolute, since it is funda-
mental with respect to some language system, determined implicitly by the formation
rules, derivation rules, and axioms of its metalanguage. The applicability of any logical
system depends upon how well it serves its recognized purpose, whether it be a calculus
constructed by known men or a naturally developed language constructed gradually by
many unknown men; therefore it is not surprising that the basic foundations of the highly
developed language systems that these philosophers and mathematicians had command
of contained concepts mutually recognized as important.
It should be noted that the basic concepts referred to by the fundamental sentence-
meanings are man's constructs, not things of the world; they are man's way of looking
at the world, organizing its material in ways useful to him. The fundamental sentence-
meanings refer to such concepts as necessary and sufficient conditions, causality,
generalization, unexpected occurrences, and possibilities. Since these are man's
concepts, a pertinent question that one should raise about the possibility of writing con-
trastive grammars for languages in general and about the possibility of mechanical
translation from any language to any language, in particular, is: Are the fundamental
sentence -meanings belonging to each of the natural languages that are expressible by
the manifold linguistic devices displayed by each of these widely differing grammars,
sufficiently universal to serve as the mapping functions with which to coordinate the
sentence-types of any language system with those of any other language system? Could
there be such wide agreement about what concepts are fundamental even though the cul-
tural environments of man are so diverse? I think one can make an educated guess
QPR No. 69 179
(XIII. MECHANICAL TRANSLATION)
based on empirical evidence that it is quite likely that there would be considerable over-
lap of the fundamental sentence -meanings belonging to different language systems.
During the natural weeding-out process that must have taken place during the develop-
ment of a language, it must have been found out from experience that knowledge of some
concepts served man's purposes better than others; hence the general adoption of gram-
matical techniques to express these important ideas was not just arbitrary; they were
selected in terms of their being the best instruments to reach a goal. The goals deter-
mining the selection processes are the primary needs and purposes of man. And his
most fundamental need is to get along in his environment. Language then has to be an
instrument that is capable of communicating knowledge that members of a language
community need to express and wish to express to one another. To help one another to
adjust to nature, to control it to some extent, to make plans, men need to predict it, to
have some sense of order, to construct laws about it, and so forth. Concepts like nec-
essary and sufficient conditions, concepts necessary for the possibility of making infer-
ences, concepts like negation and affirmation that permit the possibility of distinguishing
between truth and falsehood would all appear universally needed by a society that is
intelligent enough to create and use such an abstract and complicated system of conven-
tional signs as a language. Also, as our biological knowledge of the organization of the
human brain increases, it may at some future time be shown that, in the evolutionary
process of adaptation, the human brain became structured in such a way that it organ-
izes the raw material of the senses in specific ways.
An interesting project would be a comparison in the sophistication of the concepts
involved in fundamental sentence -meaning - all languages possess fundamental sentence -
meanings, if not the same ones - between the language of a highly civilized society and
the language of what is considered by anthropologists to be a very primitive society.
Elinor K. Charney
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